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IV. CONCLUSION
Although in Hebel the decision was not limited to automobile accident
situations in which the parent is insured, the rationale of the court is per-
suasive only where insurance is in fact present. The court appeared to as-
sume that no suit will be brought unless insurance is present." However, if
in a case similar to Hebel the record revealed the absence of liability insur-
ance, the court's reasoning, that the general availability and wide preva-
lence of automobile insurance negates the principal arguments for barring
the action, would be both unconvincing and contradictory. If the reasons
for barring an action by the child are valid, the general availability of in-
surance is no argument for the abrogation of parental immunity. Unless
the parent is insured, a recovery by the child would deplete the family
finances. When the burden of the suit falls on the parent rather than on the
insurance company, there is likely to be disruption of domestic harmony
and parental discipline. The better view of insurance in such cases seems
to be that the "existence or non-existence of insurance must be considered
irrelevant . . . ."" Although Hebel is one more authority in the trend away
from family immunities, it is not likely to have a significant influence in
other jurisdictions."
The courts should make a frontal attack on the reasons given for barring
an action by the minor against the parent. Domestic harmony is not a valid
consideration where the parent has falsely imprisoned,' raped,- or used
cruel and inhuman treatmentS against the child. A minor who receives in-
juries due to the negligence of a parent should not be denied recovery for
injuries which may last beyond minority. The reasons which underlie par-
ental immunity shoud be re-examined, and more emphasis should be placed
on the need to protect the personal security of the minor child.
Glen A. Majure
Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants: A Post-Gideon View
Borst, a candidate for sheriff in Minnesota, issued a circular regarding
the qualifications of his opponent and was charged with violating a Minne-
sota statute' which makes it a misdemeanor knowingly to publish a false
statement about a candidate for public office. Borst was arraigned and re-
quested a continuance to enable him to retain counsel. Later he appeared
without counsel and requested appointment of one, claiming he was finan-
38 1d. at 12.
"
9 Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105, 110 (Iowa 1968).
4 Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1968), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa
barred a negligence action by a minor against his father, rejecting reasoning similar to that in
Hebel.
4'Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
4 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
41 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
'MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.08 (1962).
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cially unable to secure his own. This request was denied, and Borst was
convicted at a trial in which he made no statements, offered no testimony,
introduced no exhibits, and conducted no cross examinations. Borst peti-
tioned to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct
the lower court to appoint counsel. Held, reversed and remanded: The fair
administration of justice requires that counsel be appointed for indigents
when incarceration in a penal institution can result from conviction. State
v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT TRIAL
Federal Developments. Right to counsel in federal courts is governed by
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.' This amendment
does not indicate on its face whether this right is limited only to retained
counsel or is broad enough to encompass a right to appointed counsel if an
accused is financially unable to afford his own. However, this question was
resolved in the felony case of Johnson v. Zerbst, where the Supreme Court
held that, absent a competent and intelligent waiver of right to counsel,
convictions obtained without the presence of counsel violate the sixth
amendment and are therefore void.' Zerbst was later extended to include
misdemeanors in Evans v. Rives,' where the defendant received a one-year
sentence for failure to provide for the support and maintenance of a minor
child. The Evans court found no distinction between a deprivation of lib-
erty for a long period of time and a short while. The reasoning of Zerbst
was codified in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, and the right to counsel
in federal courts is now governed by the Act. The Act provides that the
federal district courts shall have plans for furnishing counsel to indigents
charged with felonies and misdemeanors other than petty offenses.' A petty
offense is defined as one carrying a maximum penalty of six months im-
prisonment and/or a $500 fine.8
State Courts. Right to counsel in state courts is primarily derived from
state constitutions, which provide the right in varying degrees.' Any right
to counsel arising from the United States Constitution comes from the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and not directly from the
sixth amendment. 0 In Powell v. Alabama" the due process clause was ap-
a U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 666 (1947).
3304 U.S. 458 (1938).
4 Id. at 468.
5 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
618 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
'It must be noted that by excluding petty offenses Congress has concluded counsel need not
be furnished in all criminal cases.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
ORepresentative examples are CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. CONST. decl. of rts. § 11; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 10; N.Y. CoNST. art. 1, § 6; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. In Virginia, right to
counsel is provided by an interpretation of a general rights of the accused section of the Virginia
Constitution. See Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 670 (1940).
10 There is some opinion to the contrary. State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964);
Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Ob-
servations, 48 MINN. L. Ruv. 1 (1963).
"287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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plied to a state criminal prosecution. Powell and two others, all Negroes,
were charged with the rape of a white girl. All three were held under close
military guard because of the hostile community sentiment. The conviction
was appealed on the basis of an ineffective appointment of counsel, 12 and
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that "in a capital case, where the de-
fendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of making his own
defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is
the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him
as a necessary requisite of due process of law."'" However, the Court's lan-
guage hinted at a potentially broader holding. 4 The ruling of Powell was
extended in Betts v. Brady." Noting that due process is a concept "more
fluid" than the rest of the Constitution, the Court held that counsel must
be appointed where "certain circumstances" existed."0 These "certain cir-
cumstances" must "constitute a denial of fundamental fairness" and be
"shocking to the universal sense of justice." The Court concluded that
"denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of the facts in a
given case."' 7 The inherent vagueness of Betts was a built-in expansion fac-
tor, and case after case demonstrated the willingness of the Court to find
the required special circumstances." By the time of Gideon v. Wain-
wright," Betts had "revealed itself as overruled by its manifest erosion.
' '
In Gideon Mr. Justice Black commented that "reason and reflection require
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any per-
son haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."" Disturbed by this sweeping
language, Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized that the decision was limited to
serious cases and that the sixth amendment was not carried full sweep to
the states, but that the mere existence of a serious charge constitutes, in it-
self, a special circumstance.
2
II. POST-GrDEON DEVELOPMENTS
There has been some consistency in the few decisions attempting to set a
lower limit to the serious offense rule. Generally, the possibility of a one-
" The trial court had appointed the bar as a whole to represent the defendants, and at the
trial a lawyer volunteered his services and participated in a non-official capacity.
3287 U.S. at 71.
14Id. at 68-69: "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law."
"S316 U.S. 455 (1942).
11 Id. at 462. But for an unknown reason this became known as the "special" circumstances test.
17 Id.
"SChewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (complex recidivist statute); Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (frightened youth); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948)
(inexperienced youth); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (tricky legal point and an ignorant
Indian defendant).
"9372 U.S. 335 (1963).
"0 Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INsTrru-O S TODAY AND To-
MORROW 48, 54 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959).
2" 372 U.S. at 344.
22Id. at 351-52. A serious charge is one that carries the possibility of a substantial prison sen-
tence. See note 23 infra.
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year prison sentence seems to be the lower limit."s This limitatiqof the
right to appointed counsel to serious offenses only, a limitation ndt even
mentioned in the opinion of the full court, has created much controversy
over the extension of right to counsel to misdemeanants, as American
courts and judicial critics have become increasingly concerned with the
legal disadvantages created by poverty."
One problem that has confronted the courts is that there is a lack of a
standard definition of a misdemeanor. While generally a misdemeanor is
viewed as an offense of a non-serious nature, some misdemeanors carry
sizeable penalties.' At the same time some felonies carry only relatively
mild punishments. Compounding this problem is the fact that a particular
offense may be classified a felony in one state and a misdemeanor in an-
other." Moreover, even if the offense is a misdemeanor from state to state,
the punishment for the crime may vary widely." The punishment for
some misdemeanors may be so severe as to place them within the Gideon
serious offense rule.s
For those offenses not clearly within the Gideon rule, decisions have
varied." The leading case requiring counsel is Harvey v. Mississippi.' Har-
vey arose in the Fifth Circuit under the federal habeas corpus powers' and
involved a Negro who had been charged with possession of whiskey and
assessed a $500 fine and a ninety-day jail sentence.2 The court emphasized
that an accused needs counsel before making a plea because of the legal
complexities involved in deciding whether a guilty plea is advisable and
because of the serious consequences which may result even in a misde-
"sBrinson v. State, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397
(D. Conn. 1966); Irvin v. State, 203 So. 2d 283 (Ala. Ct. App. 1967). Since these decisions have
all concerned sentences of more than one year, they are dicta. Some doubt about the one-year rule
may have been created by dicta in the recent decision of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
in which sixth amendment jury trial rights were applied to an offense for which a sentence up to
two years could be given. Dicta strongly suggested a preference for a six-months rule, although
some leeway was given for states to explore. It must be remembered that all provisions of the
sixth amendment do not necessarily apply with equal force to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Thus a right to counsel will not necessarily exist for offenses for which a right to
a jury trial exists.
24ABA, LAWYERS AND THE POOR (1965); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT (1965); FORD FOUNDA-
TION, . . . AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (1967); 1964-65 Committee of the State Bar of Georgia on
Compensated Counsel, Assistance to the Indigent Person Charged with Crime, 2 GA. ST. B.J. 197
(1965); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1434
(1965); Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 19 Sw. L.J. 593
(1965); Note, Legal Aid for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 18 VAND. L. REV. 837 (1965).
'N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:118-1 (1952) (life for kidnapping, a high misdemeanor).
" An example is adultery, a misdemeanor in Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-908 (1964),
and a felony in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. S 798.01 (1965), and in most states.
7 Illustrative is the offense of ordinary promotion of gambling. Miss. CODE ANN. S 2190
(1942) (twenty days); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 225.05 (McKinney 1967) (one year).
2 Brinson v. State, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397
(Conn. 1966); Irvin v. State, 203 So. 2d 283 (Ala. Ct. App. 1967); State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz.
123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964). This is probably true generally of what are known as high misde-
meanors.
19See notes 30 through 49 infra.
10340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
8'28 U.S.C. 5 2241 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
Is The Harvey case had some peculiar facets. The entire process took place on the front lawn
of a Justice of the Peace. Furthermore, since Harvey housed civil rights workers there were some
racial overtones to the conviction.
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meanor case." The reasoning of Harvey was followed in McDonald v.
Moore.4 McDonald was arrested and convicted of the illegal sale and pos-
session of liquor. She sought a new trial on the grounds that she was not ad-
vised of her right to counsel. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that a right
to counsel did exist and that the defendant should have been so advised.
Although the court emphasized that the right to counsel was not unlimited,
it failed to enunciate any definite standards." Thus, the right to counsel is
definitely established in the Fifth Circuit, but its limits are not clearly de-
fined."
The Harvey standard generally has not been followed in other jurisdic-
tions. Most courts have relied upon the serious offense standards of Gideon,7
but another approach applies the right only to non-petty offenses, thereby
incorporating the federal standard as prescribed by the Criminal Justice
Act."0 Other courts have returned to the federally rejected Betts standard,
applying a case-by-case judgment based upon consideration of all the cir-
cumstances.3
Recent Developments. In Cableton v. State° a defendant was convicted
of several misdemeanors and assessed fines totalling $521.50 and jail sen-
tences totalling nine months. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held
that an accused misdemeanant need not be provided counsel if he is unable
to afford his own.41 The court rejected the contention that the federal
standards for providing counsel applied directly to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It concluded that the
fourteenth amendment required only what was necessary for "ordered
liberty."' Thus, a state need not provide counsel in all the circumstances
that would require it if the sixth amendment applied directly, but only in
those circumstances that "are fundamental and essential to a fair trial."''
Great emphasis was placed on the practical considerations involved, in that
there are so many cases of this type that appointment of counsel would be
a "practical impossibility.""
Although most courts have applied right to counsel to at least some de-
33 340 F.2d at 269.
34353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
asId. at 108.
"SPetition of Thomas, 361 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. La. 1966).
17 See footnote 28 supra.
" People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965) (speeding).
"
9 Creighton v. North Carolina, 257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.C. 1966). It is usually then left to
the trial judge to decide when to appoint, and an appellate court will give his judgment considerable
weight. See State v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. 624, 222 A.2d 752, ce-rt. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966);
State v. Sherron, 268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966); State v. Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 147
S.E.2d 237 (1966).
40243 Ark. 351, 420 S.W.2d 534 (1967).
Old. at 537-38.
" Id. at 537. It must be noted that Arkansas law requires appointment of counsel only in felony
cases. ARK. STAT. ANN. S 43-1203 (1964).43 d.
441d. at 538. The court pointed out that the sixty-one municipal courts of the state had




fendants in misdemeanor cases,' there is considerable opinion denying the
right altogether."8 In the North Carolina case of State v. Sherron" the de-
fendant appealed a ninety-day jail sentence, claiming that counsel should
have been appointed. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
counsel need be appointed only if the trial court felt it was necessary."' As
is true of most cases denying the right to counsel altogether, the court
went no further in its explanation than to say that the Supreme Court had
refused to apply Gideon to misdemeanors." Thus the courts have found a
variety of answers to the problem of right to counsel, ranging from a seem-
ingly unlimited right to counsel to total denial.
III. STATE V. BORST
In Borst the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to avoid the federal
constitutional issue of right to counsel. The court surveyed the various deci-
sions and concluded that the holdings dealing with right to counsel could
not be reconciled." As a result, the court was free to create its own rule."
The court first specifically rejected the belief that its rule could be based on
the name given an offense." It also rejected the serious offense rule of Gid-
eon. The court recognized that there is something inherently more serious
in a loss of liberty than the payment of a fine and that a defendant is as
helpless to defend himself against a non-serious charge as a serious one.
While a ninety-day jail sentence, the maximum for a misdemeanor under
Minnesota law, might be considered a petty offense by many courts, it
would still be of considerable consequence to the defendant himself." Thus,
the court apparently concluded that Gideon did not go far enough and held
that counsel must be provided where incarceration is possible.' Further-
more, whenever the statute" providing for incarceration when a fine is
not paid is to be invoked, right to counsel attaches."
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Peterson sought to exclude traffic
offenses from the majority rule." This was based on two considerations.
First, traffic offenses rarely involve jail sentences, are usually simple to try,
and carry little social stigma." Thus, the consequences of denying counsel
in traffic cases would be minimal. Second, the indigent would actually be in
4 Of recent origin are a few cases that have taken an interesting approach in holding that
violations of municipal ordinances do not require appointment of counsel. See City of New Orleans
v. Cook, 249 La. 820, 191 So. 2d 634 (1966); People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66
(1967) (dictum).
40Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964); State v. Brown, 250 La. 1023, 201 So. 2d 277
(1967); Cortinez v. Flournoy, 249 La. 741, 190 So. 2d 909, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 335 (1962);
State v. Sherron, 268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966); Commonwealth v. Keenan, 185 Pa. Super.
49, 138 A.2d 259 (1958); Sosa v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 575, 330 S.W.2d 621 (1960).
47268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
"'This is allowed under state law. N.C. GgN. STAT. 15-4.1 (1965).
4 See Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
5 154 N.W.2d at 889-94.
" This was especially true since the court based its decision on its inherent supervisory powers
over its lower courts.
52 154 N.W.2d at 893.
"Id. at 893-94.
54 Id. at 894.
55MINN. STAT. ANN. S 574.35 (1947).
5 154 N.W.2d at 894.
57 d. at 896.
5' The major exception is usually driving while intoxicated.
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a better position than a person who could afford to procure counsel of his
own. Most people, although able to afford an attorney to fight a traffic
charge, do not do so, because it is less expensive to pay the ticket. Thus the
indigent, who would be able to demand counsel, as a practical matter would
be afforded more than equal protection of the laws. Moreover, the indigent
would be in an advantageous position to bargain for a reduced charge to
save the state the considerable expense of an attorney-assisted trial. 9
The Borst majority opinion can be directly contrasted with the recom-
mendations of the American Bar Association." Under the ABA plan, the
determination of the need for counsel would not be based on the facts of
a particular case, but the line would be drawn "at those types of offenses
for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility."'" What
is meant by the term "practical possibility" is not explained, although the
term would seem to exclude most traffic offenses."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Proposals as to when right to counsel should attach are not lacking. 3 The
inherently vague serious offense rule probably will be abandoned. The fel-
ony-misdemeanor line is unwise since it is not a standard at all, 4 allowing
a constitutional right to depend on the name a legislature gives an offense."
It has been proposed that a right to counsel apply only when the offense
contains a social stigma, even if jail is not likely. " Three other possibilities
suggested are to provide counsel only when the defendant requests, when
conviction would expose the defendant to substantial public ridicule, and
when conviction would mean substantial economic loss. 7
The answer to the right to counsel question is crucial, not only because
of its effect on the conduct of the trial, but because logically if counsel
must be provided at trial, it must be provided at the pre-trial stages under
Escobedo v. Illinois."0 It would also seem that any additional rights implied
by the Griffin v. Illinois9 and Douglas v. California" holdings may have to
'9154 N.W.2d at 898.0 "Counsel should be provided in all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of
liberty, except those types of offenses for which such punishment is not likely to be imposed, re-
gardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise." ABA ADVISORY COMMrr-
TEE ON THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 37-38 (1967).
oo Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
"6Will courts have to use statistical analysis of what has happened previously in cases of a
similar type? Does a 50% incarceration rate for convictions for a certain offense equal a "practical
possibility"? 60%? 70%?
0 Siegal, Gideon and Beyond: Achieving an Adequate Defense for the Indigent, 59 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 73, 84 (1968); Comment, Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants in State Courts, 20
ARK. L. REp. 156 (1966); Comment, Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1322 (1966); Comment, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545
(1967).
04 See notes 25 through 27 supsra, and accompanying text.
' Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy
Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1963).
00 An example that is often used is driving while intoxicated.
07 Comment, Right to Counsel for Misdemeanants in State Courts, 20 ARK. L. REV. 156 (1966).
60378 U.S. 478 (1963).
09 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (transcript for use on appeal must be furnished without cost to indigent
when the transcript is necessary to make an appeal).
70 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (counsel must be supplied for appeal following conviction).
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be extended to misdemeanants."
Seemingly, right to counsel should be expanded. A defendant faces be-
fore, during, and after trial a bewildering variety of rules. He is ill-equip-
ped to face, on equal terms, his well-trained adversaries. These factors
arise in important cases as well as in not so important ones. Providing the
needed counsel presents a serious challenge to American legal resources and
ingenuity. Shall the needed counsel be provided through private defender
systems, public defender system, legal clinics staffed by law school stu-
dents, or some combination of the three? The answer will lie in some bal-
ance of the desirability of providing counsel for all and the practicality of
a limited number of competent practitioners. The answer can be a flexible
standard which inherently is vague or a fixed standard which may seem
arbitrary. The Minnesota Supreme Court has opted for a fixed standard,
which in view of the problems created by the vague Betts holding, is prob-
ably for the best. The Borst approach, especially if modified along the lines
suggested by Mr. Justice Peterson, is a logical approach. It has the advan-
tage of affording a clear-cut rule which can be applied by even the usually
non-legally-educated local magistrates. It is not the best of all answers, but,
given the state of legal services in the United States, it represents a logical
compromise. But though Borst represents a logical, justifiable resting place,
only the United States Supreme Court can decide just how permanent this
resting place will be.
Gary R. Rice
Statutory Merger Involves a Purchase or
Sale of Securities for Purposes of Rule 1 Ob-5
The defendants, a group of officers and directors of the Susquehanna
Corporation (the "Lannan Group"), conspired with one Korholz to de-
fraud Susquehanna. Initially, the Lannan Group sold 435,000 shares of
Susquehana to Korholz at a price $1,740,000 in excess of fair market
value. The group then resigned, vesting control of Susquehanna in Korholz
and his nominees. Korholz, who was also chairman of the board of another
corporation, American Gypsum, sold the Susquehanna shares to Gypsum,
which obtained a bank loan for substantially all of the purchase price.
Finally, Korholz caused the boards of directors of Gypsum and Susque-
hanna to recommend to their stockholders a statutory merger' of Gypsum
into Susquehanna. The terms of the merger provided for an exchange of
1.9 shares of Gypsum for one share of Susquehanna, a ratio which repre-
sented a gross over-valuation of Gypsum. These fraudulent manipulations
prompted a derivative suit by several minority shareholders of Susquehan-
71 On this subject in general, see Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent
Criminal Defendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963).
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S 368(a) (1) (A).
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